Slippery Slopes and the Alien Explanation

Slippery slopes are themselves a slippery concept. Imagine trying to explain them to an alien:

“Well, we right-thinking people are quite sure that the Holocaust happened, so banning Holocaust denial would shut up some crackpots and improve the discourse. But it’s one step on the road to things like banning unpopular political positions or religions, and we right-thinking people oppose that, so we won’t ban Holocaust denial.”

The alien might well respond:

“But you could just ban Holocaust denial, but not ban unpopular political positions or religions. Then you right-thinking people get the thing you want, but not the thing you don’t want.”

Abandoning the Power of Choice

This is the boring, non-philosophical reply mentioned only for completeness. In this reply, giving up one point risks losing the ability to decide whether or not to give up other points. In effect, it is a straightforward “Don’t give up useful tools for [[fighting tyranny]]” argument. It may not even properly qualify as a slippery slope argument at all.

The Legend of Murder-Gandhi

Previously on Less Wrong’s The Adventures of Murder-Gandhi:

  • Scenario: Gandhi is offered a pill that will turn him into an unstoppable murderer.
    • He refuses the pill because, as a pacifist, he doesn’t want others to die.
    • Even if offered $1 million, his abhorrence of violence would lead him to refuse.
  • Alternate Offer:
    Suppose Gandhi is offered $1 million to take a different pill—one which would decrease his reluctance to murder by 1%.
    • This seems like a good deal: even with 1% less reluctance, he remains quite pacifist, and he could donate the money to charity.
    • Gandhi accepts.
  • Iteration:
    Now, each time Gandhi takes another 1%-less-reluctance pill, he is offered another $1 million for the same pill.
    • Perhaps original Gandhi, upon sober contemplation, would decide to accept $5 million to become 5% less reluctant.
    • However, after a few iterations, the decision is made not by original Gandhi, but by his future self—say, 95%-Gandhi—who may be more inclined to push further.
    • Eventually, the cumulative effect could lead to a future Gandhi who is so far removed from his original pacifism that he becomes a murderer.
  • Schelling Point as a Precommitment:
    To prevent this slippery progression, Gandhi might “fence off” the slope by establishing a Schelling point—an arbitrary dividing line with special value.
    • For example, he could swear an oath to take only five pills.
    • Alternatively, he might give his most valuable possessions to a trusted friend who will destroy them if he takes more than five pills.
    • This precommitment would force his future self to adhere to the 95% boundary, even if that future self is tempted to lower the threshold further.

Real-world slippery slopes resemble this example when changing rules leads to changes in our opinions about those rules. For instance, the Catholic Church might argue:

“If we give up this traditional practice, people will lose respect for tradition and will push to give up even more traditional practices.”

Slippery Hyperbolic Discounting

Imagine one evening you start playing Sid Meier’s Civilization (IV—since V is terrible). You have work tomorrow, so you plan to stop and go to sleep by midnight.

  • At midnight:
    You feel an urge to keep playing but know you’ll be miserable tomorrow if you don’t get enough sleep. Being a hyperbolic discounter, you value the next ten minutes a lot, but beyond that the curve flattens.
    • You decide: “I will play for ten minutes—just one more turn—and then go to bed.”

  • At 12:10:
    The same process occurs: you decide to play until 12:20 because the next ten minutes still have high value compared to later time.

  • Iteration:
    This continues until your empire bestrides the globe and the rising sun peeks through your windows.

The process here mirrors the Murder-Gandhi example, where the “value-changing pill” is replaced by time and your hyperbolic discounting.
The solution is the same:
If you consider the problem early, you can precommit to a nice round number (e.g., midnight) as a Schelling point. Then, when it comes time to decide whether to keep playing past midnight, you frame it not as choosing between “midnight or 12:10” but rather as choosing between adhering to your precommitment (midnight) or abandoning your only credible Schelling point—and likely playing all night.
(If you consider the problem at 12:01, you might precommit to 12:10, but that is not as natural a Schelling point.)

Coalitions of Resistance

Suppose you belong to a small religious minority—say, Zoroastrians, making up 1% of the population. In your country, there are 50 small religions each comprising 1% of the population, while 49% of the populace is atheist and hostile to religion.

  • You hear that the government is considering banning the Taoists (1% of the population).
    • Since you dislike the Taoists, you go along with this ban.
  • When you hear that the government wants to ban Sikhs and Jains, you follow suit.

Now you find yourself in the situation described by Martin Niemöller:

“First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out, because I was not a socialist.
Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out, because I was not a trade unionist.
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out, because I was not a Jew.
Then they came for me, but we had already abandoned the only defensible Schelling point.”

With the banned Taoists, Sikhs, and Jains no longer invested in defending their existence, the 49% atheist majority gains enough clout to ban your own religion along with others.
The better strategy would have been for all 51 small religions to form a coalition to defend one another’s right to exist—perhaps via an ecumenical congress or another coordination mechanism.

In practice, there aren’t 51 clearly delineated religions but billions of people, each with their own opinions. Coordination on such a scale is impractical; instead, people must rely on Schelling points to approximate collective defense.

In the original alien example, I “cheated” by referring to “right-thinking people.” In reality, deciding who qualifies for the Right-Thinking People Club is part of the problem.
So far, the practical solution has been for everyone to agree—without overthinking it—to defend each other’s existence, rather than trying to coordinate a nuanced set of exceptions (e.g., allowing Holocaust deniers but banning other extremist speech).

In parts of Europe, Holocaust denial has been banned for years without apparent collapse of free discourse—often because such exemptions have become traditional Schelling points, or the exceptions are so obvious that almost everyone (except the deniers) agrees.

Summary

Slippery slopes legitimately exist wherever a policy not only affects the world directly but also affects people’s willingness or ability to oppose future policies. Such slopes can sometimes be avoided by establishing a “Schelling fence”—a Schelling point that the various interest groups (or you, over time) can credibly precommit to defending.

Key Insight:
A “Schelling fence” is often of supreme importance even when there aren’t multiple interest groups involved, because in most conflicts precommitments are difficult to communicate.

If you can credibly commit to defending a certain line—even if the cost of defense is higher than the prize—the rational opponent is deterred. Without such a commitment, the opponent may mount an overwhelming attack, expecting you to retreat.

Remarks

Remark 1: Communicating Initial Commitments

“There are people who, no matter how long you explain, will never be convinced to get vaccinated.”
—
What we should actually do is prevent those that anti-vaxxers might convince from remaining uninformed about vaccination facts, because we can’t trust society’s common-sense approach or assume this knowledge is obvious.

  • Point: Schelling points often have enormous significance even when there aren’t many interest groups involved.
  • Example: The famous Martin Niemöller quote illustrates how failing to maintain a credible Schelling point can lead to widespread loss of protection.

Remark 2: The Personal Cost of Restrictive Speech Laws

In reflecting on free speech and historical memory, I grapple with a personal connection to the Holocaust—my family includes survivors and even a great uncle marked by a concentration camp tattoo. Despite this, I have grown increasingly uncomfortable with laws criminalizing Holocaust denial.

  • Concern: Such laws set a precedent for restricting free speech.
  • Observation: In my country, where Holocaust denial is illegal, this prohibition is now being used to justify new laws targeting specific political viewpoints.
  • Implication: We must remain vigilant in preserving fundamental freedoms even when it means protecting speech we find abhorrent.

Remark 3: The Slippery Slope in Practice

“Give up on the Holocaust deniers, and no one else can be sure what other Schelling point you’ve committed to, if any…”

“…unless they can. In parts of Europe, they’ve banned Holocaust denial for years and everyone’s been totally okay with it.”

  • Issue: Some argue that European countries have slipped from banning Holocaust denial to prosecuting those who object to immigration or trans politics.
  • Challenge: I have yet to find clear evidence of prosecutions solely for objecting to immigration.
  • Observation: When I ask for sources, responses are vague or dismissive.
  • Conclusion: Demanding examples of prosecutions for merely objecting to immigration is a near-impossible task, as critics may always claim that any given example qualifies as hate speech.

Remark 4: Political Examples from the UK

Below are some examples of anti-immigration sentiments expressed by public figures in the UK, without resulting in prosecution:

  • Nigel Farage:
    • Stated that a high immigration rate—with people speaking different languages and having different cultural attitudes—creates significant social problems.
    • Complained that past governments opened the doors to immigration, and that has led to current issues.
  • Suella Braverman (UK Home Secretary):
    • Asserted that the British people deserve to know which party is serious about stopping what she calls an “invasion” on the southern coast.
    • Cited figures like 40,000 arrivals in a year, many allegedly facilitated by criminal gangs.
    • Although criticized, she has not faced prosecution or censure.
  • Richard Tice (Reform Party):
    • Spoke about a “betrayal of Brexit” via current immigration levels.
    • Advocated for zero net immigration outside healthcare.
    • His statements have not led to legal trouble.
  • Eric Zemmour (French Presidential Candidate):
    • Called for forcible “remigration” of illegal immigrants.
    • Has faced legal issues for other extreme remarks, but these differ from mere objections to immigration.

These examples illustrate that while controversial, anti-immigration sentiments are often not prosecuted—especially when they do not cross into overt hate speech.

Remark 5: Complexity in Public Discourse

When discussing policies or ideas, there is a danger in assuming that the audience shares your background knowledge.

  • Example: A biologist might casually invoke “the simplest explanation” as a knockdown argument for evolution.
  • Problem: For someone not raised to revere Occam’s Razor, that phrase may be unconvincing.
  • Lesson: A clear argument must build an inferential pathway from what the audience already knows to the new claim. Otherwise, the speaker risks sounding arrogant or condescending.

By understanding how Schelling points function—as well as the concepts of slippery slopes and hyperbolic discounting—we gain valuable tools for both constructing and deconstructing arguments. These insights help explain the challenges of communication across inferential distances, whether in personal decision-making, political debate, or scientific discourse.